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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we propose a malware categorization method that 
models malware behavior in terms of instructions using PageRank. 
PageRank computes ranks of web pages based on structural 
information and can also compute ranks of instructions that 
represent the structural information of the instructions in malware 
analysis methods. Our malware categorization method uses the 
computed ranks as features in machine learning algorithms. In the 
evaluation, we compare the effectiveness of different PageRank 
algorithms and also investigate bagging and boosting algorithms 
to improve the categorization accuracy. 
CCS Concepts 
• Security and privacy➝Intrusion/anomaly and malware 
mitigation➝Malware and its mitigation. 
Keywords 
Malware categorization; malware classification; PageRank; 
dynamic analysis. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Malware detection and classification play a very important part in 
malware defense. Malware categorization is a malware 
classification technique that classifies malware into certain 
categories [1]. For example, multiple malware can be classified as 
a single malware family or a single type of malware (e.g. Trojan). 
Malware categorization can be used to discover similar malware, 
or groups of unknown malware, and analysts can use this 
additional information in further investigations on the malware. 
Since malware categorization can be also extended to malware 
detection, malware categorization can play an important role in 
malware defense. 
Previous studies on malware categorization investigated various 
characteristics of malware and proposed categorization methods 
utilizing those characteristics. Malware is a program that consists 
of instructions and the instructions define the behavior of the 
malware. Therefore, many existing methods proposed various 
forms of instruction information such as instruction sequence, 
frequency and etc. Malware variants in the same malware family 
tend to reuse the original code and be written in the same 
development environment such as editors and compilers. 
Compiling the reused code with the same compiler will produce 
the same result, i.e. the same low-level instructions in the same 
structure. Some malware, which are classed as the same malware 
type (e.g. Trojan), have similar purposes and sometimes behave in 
the same way. Because of similar functionalities, those malware 
may share similar code. 
Over the last few years, many research efforts have been 
conducted on developing automatic malware categorization 
systems. Various features have also been researched including 
instruction frequency [4-7] and sequence [8-11], control flow 
graph [12-14] and so on. Since a PageRank-based software 
analysis method [15] has been proposed, there is a need for 
investigation on PageRank in malware analysis. 
In this paper, we propose a malware categorization method that 
models malware behavior in terms of instructions using PageRank. 
PageRank [2] is a graph-based ranking technique that computes 
ranks of nodes representing an importance of each node based on 
the structural information between nodes. A Windows-based 
malware can be disassembled into a set of code that consists of 
assembly instructions (hereafter instructions) and graphs, where a 
node is an instruction and an edge represents a sequence of two 
instructions, can be generated from the code. Ranks of 
instructions can be computed using PageRank and the ranks will 
be different between different malware. We investigate a number 
of existing PageRank algorithms [2-3] and compare the 
performance of the algorithms for malware categorization. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
summarizes the related work. Section 3 describes our proposed 
malware categorization method with a number of existing 
PageRank algorithms. Section 4 evaluates our proposed method. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and outlines avenues for 
future work. 
2. RELATED WORK 
For many years, malware categorization has been done by human 
analysts but the manual analysis is time-consuming and labor-
intensive [1]. Thus there has been a need for automatic malware 
categorization methods. One of the most essential parts in 
malware categorization is the feature extraction and several 
features have been proposed. 
Since Bilar [4] discovered that the distribution of instruction 
frequency varies in different groups of malware, several methods 
have been proposed based on instruction frequency. Rad et al. [5] 
compute Minkowski-form distance of instruction frequency 
vectors to measure function similarities of malware variants. Ye et 
al. [1] applies term frequency and inverse document frequency 
(TF-IDF) to instruction frequency before clustering. Santamarta 
[6] extracts instruction frequency from the first 150 executed 
instruction as dynamic analysis in the proposed polymorphic 
engine classification method with neural pattern recognition. 
Kang et al. [7] compared the categorization accuracy of the 
original and repetition filtered frequencies generated from 
dynamic analysis. However, frequency information can be easily 
manipulated by obfuscation techniques. 
Several efforts have also been done to use structural information 
as a countermeasure of obfuscation techniques. N-gram-based 
methods [8-11] have been proposed to use sequence information 
and the methods mostly focus on signature generation. Santos et 
al. [11] extract n-gram frequency of instructions for malware 
classification. However, n-gram-based methods will face a very 
high dimension feature space. 
Control flow graph (CFG) analysis is another key commonly used 
in malware defense methods. A CFG represents a function and a 
program consists of multiple CFGs. Since maximum common 
sub-graph isomorphism is NP-complete, it is infeasible to 
compare CFGs directly. Gao et al. [12] use basic block 
comparison and Cesare el al. [13] use edit distance of strings 
generated from CFGs. Briones et al. [14] express a CFG in 3-
tuple: the number of basic blocks, the number of edge and the 
number of sub-calls. However, CFG processing is time-
consuming and the abstraction of CFGs loses good information 
for malware analysis. 
PageRank [2] is a graph-based ranking technique and adopted in 
software analysis by Chae et al. [15] for the first time. They apply 
PageRank on CFGs to compute ranks of system calls for software 
plagiarism detection. However, there is no further research on 
PageRank in malware analysis. In this paper, we focus on 
instructions instead and investigate different PageRank algorithms 
for malware categorization. 
3. PROPOSED METHOD 
In this section, we explain the basic idea of PageRank and present 
two PageRank algorithms used in our proposed malware 
categorization method. We also describe how to apply PageRank 
to our malware categorization method. 
3.1 PageRank 
PageRank [2] is a graph-based ranking technique used to sort web 
pages in Google search engine. The basic idea of PageRank is that 
highly linked pages are more ‘important’ than pages with few 
backlinks and pages linked by highly ranked pages are more 
‘important’ than pages linked by less ‘important’ pages. Based on 
this idea, PageRank gives a page a high rank if the sum of the 
ranks of its backlinks is high. Figure 1 shows an example of 
PageRank. In the graph of Figure 1, nodes and edges represent 
pages and links, respectively. Backlinks of a page x are the pages 
that have a link to the page x. The page E has more backlinks than 
the page D but the page A, which has a link to the page D, is a 
more ‘important’ page than the other pages B and C. Therefore, 
PageRank considers the page D more ‘important’ than the page E. 
The rank of a page x, PR(x), is given as follows: 
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B(x) denotes the set of backlinks of the page x and L(v) denotes 
the number of links of page v. The parameter d is a damping 
factor which is proposed for the random surfer model. The 
parameter d is the likelihood of users following the links instead 
of random jumps and can be set between 0 and 1. Lower values of 
d denote more random jumps and vice versa. 
 
Figure 1. PageRank 
There is a modified algorithm of PageRank, called PageRank 
based on visits of links (VOL) [3], which assumes that highly 
visited links are more ‘important’ than links with few visits. In 
VOL, the rank of a page is divided differently based on the 
number of visits for each link while the rank is evenly divided in 
the original PageRank. Figure 2 shows an example of VOL where 
the underlined number is the number of visits. The page D gets 20 
(= 2 * 100 / 10) from the page A because users only visit twice on 
this link. VOL considers the page E to be more ‘important’ than 
the page D while PageRank considered the page D more 
‘important’. 
 
Figure 2. Visits of Links 
In VOL, the rank of a page x, VOL(x), is given as follows: 
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V(x) denotes the number of visits of the link from the page v to the 
page x and TV(v) denotes the total number of visits of all links 
from the page v. 
3.2 PageRank in Malware Categorization 
Just as web pages can be structured by links, instructions similarly 
construct a program by control flows. Ranks of instructions can be 
computed by PageRank and the computed ranks will be different 
if control flows are different because the rank highly depends on 
the structural information. This is the basic idea of our malware 
categorization method. A graph, where nodes represent 
instructions and edges represent control flows, can be generated 
from a malware sample and ranks of instruction can be computed 
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by PageRank based on the generated graph. Malware of the same 
malware type or family is expected to show a similar distribution 
of ranks by PageRank and vice versa. Figure 3 shows an example 
of an instruction sequence and its graph for PageRank. 
 
Figure 3. PageRank of Instruction Sequence 
A node is created for each instruction and an edge is created for 
each 2-gram of instructions in the instruction sequence, such as 
‘mov-push’, ‘push-mov’ and so on. A 2-gram of instructions is a 
pair of two consecutive instructions in the instruction sequence 
and represents a control flow of the two instructions. By creating 
edges in this manner, the entire control flows of the instruction 
sequence can be represented in a graph. When a single instruction 
is repeated and constructs a 2-gram like ‘mov-mov’, a self-visit 
edge can be created as drawn as a dashed arrow. This self-visit 
information is not considered in the existing PageRank algorithms 
and we will investigate the impact of the self-visit information in 
the evaluation. As shown in Figure 4, the number of visits can be 
counted for VOL. The two equations (1-2) can be used to compute 
ranks of instructions without any modification on the algorithm. 
 
Figure 4. VOL of Instruction Sequence 
Instructions can be extracted in a static or dynamic approach. In 
the static approach, a disassembler can be used to translate 
machine code into assembly language but packing techniques 
make the translation hard or impossible. In the dynamic approach, 
a malware sample can be executed in a controlled environment 
such as emulation, instrumentation or debugging. Packing might 
not be an issue in the dynamic approach, but anti dynamic 
techniques also exist such as anti-debugging, anti-virtual-machine 
techniques. In our proposed method, instrumentation is chosen to 
defeat packing techniques. As a result of instrumentation, a 
sequence of executed instructions can be extracted from each 
malware and PageRank algorithms can be applied to the graph 
which is generated from the sequence of executed instructions. 
After computing ranks of instructions, we can represent the ranks 
in a vector as an instance of a single malware sample. By 
processing the above process on every malware sample, we can 
get rank vectors and use the vectors as input of machine learning 
algorithms in our proposed malware categorization method. 
4. EVALUATION 
In this section, we evaluate the PageRank algorithms: the original 
PageRank (PR) and VOL. We also investigate the impact of the 
self-visit information in the both algorithms. We use 6,721 
malware samples from VxHeaven [16] that consist of 26 malware 
families and 9 malware types as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Malware Samples 
Type Family 
# of 
Variants 
Backdoor 
Agobot 296 
Aimbot 93 
Bifrose 148 
Hupigon 334 
IRCBot 140 
PcClient 66 
Rbot 1,141 
SdBot 863 
Trojan 
Dialer 194 
StartPage 216 
Trojan-
Downloader 
Banload 321 
Dadobra 211 
Dyfuca 77 
INService 113 
IstBar 235 
Swizzor 95 
Trojan-PSW 
LdPinch 116 
Lmir 458 
Nilage 108 
QQPass 136 
Trojan-Spy 
Bancos 109 
Banker 754 
Email-Worm Bagle 128 
IM-Worm Kelvir 105 
Net-Worm Mytob 107 
P2P-Worm SpyBot 157 
Total 6,721 
 
For each malware, we traced the execution of malware using Inter 
Pin [17] and extracted executed instructions, up to five million 
instructions. As shown in Figure 3, an instruction consists of a 
single opcode and multiple operands and some instructions 
include prefixes, such as ‘lock’ and ‘rep’, or no operand. We only 
extracted mnemonics, such as ‘mov’ and ‘push’, from each 
instruction and generated a sequence of mnemonics which are 
executed by the investigated malware. We generated a graph for 
each malware using its executed mnemonic sequence and we 
applied PageRank algorithms on each generated graph and 
compared the performance of malware type and family 
classification between the PageRank algorithms using random 
forest (RF) [18] which showed good performance in several 
previous work [7]. We also investigated three meta-classifiers to 
improve the classification accuracy: bagging [19], AdaBoostM1 
[20] and MultiBoostAB [21]. We utilized WEKA Error! 
Reference source not found. to use the machine learning 
algorithms in the evaluation and used f-measure, which is the 
harmonic mean of recall and precision Error! Reference source 
not found., to compare the classification accuracy. 10-fold cross-
validation is also used. 
First, we evaluate the impact of the parameter d using RF. Figure 
5 shows the accuracy of malware categorization: (a) malware type 
classification and (b) malware family classification. SPR and 
SVOL utilize the self-visit information while PR and VOL ignore 
it. We set the number of trees to 10 in RF. As shown in Figure 5, 
the classification accuracy tends to be increased as the parameter 
d is increased. As described in section 3.1, the parameter d is the 
likelihood of users’ following the links instead of random jumps 
which are “interrupts” in the program execution. Therefore, this 
tendency tells us that “interrupts” were rare in the malware 
executions. In most cases of our evaluation, it showed the best 
classification accuracy when we use 1 as the parameter d. 
 
(a) malware type classification 
 
(b) malware family classification 
Figure 5. Malware categorization with Random Forest 
We also investigated bagging and boosting algorithms to improve 
the classification accuracy of RF. The bagging and boosting 
algorithms will repeat the tree construction of RF to construct 
better trees. Bagging iterates classifier learning with different 
training sets, called bags, to reduce variance. In the evaluation, the 
size of bag and the number of iterations are set to 100% and 10, 
respectively. Boosting also reduces bias primarily and variance by 
iterating classifier learning and focusing on misclassified 
instances in every iteration. AdaBoostM1 boosts a nominal class 
classifier and MultiBoostAB is an extension of AdaBoost, 
combining wagging’s superior variance reduction. In the both 
boosting algorithms, the number of iterations is set to 10. We used 
default settings of WEKA. 
MultiBoostAB shows the best classification accuracy in most cases. 
SVOL is the best PageRank algorithm which shows the best 
classification accuracy with MultiBoostAB: 85% in malware type 
classification and 72% in malware family classification. 
 
(a) malware type classification 
 
(b) malware family classification 
Figure 6. Bagging and Boosting 
Table 2 shows the elapsed time for training and testing in SVOL. 
Bagging and boosting algorithms consumed more time compared 
to RF. It was a few seconds in this evaluation but it might not be 
fast enough in real situations. We need to decide which one is 
more important between the accuracy and the speed when we 
choose a good classifier. 
Table 2. Training and Testing Time (sec.) 
Classifiers 
Malware Type 
Classification 
Malware Family 
Classification 
RF 0.69 / 0.0 0.98 / 0.0 
Bagging 5.60 / 0.03 7.97 / 0.04 
AdaBoostM1 6.56 / 0.03 8.18 / 0.03 
MultiBoostAB 5.88 / 0.03 8.92 / 0.04 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we proposed PageRank-based malware 
categorization method that classifies malware types or families. 
First, we described how to utilize PageRank algorithms in 
malware categorization. A graph can be constructed from a 
sequence of executed instructions and ranks of the executed 
instructions can be computed by applying PageRank algorithms 
on the constructed graph. We can use the computed ranks as 
features in machine learning algorithms for malware 
categorization. In the evaluation, MultiBoostAB with SVOL 
showed the best classification accuracy but RF with SVOL also 
showed good classification accuracy and speed. This result shows 
that the use of the self-visit information can improve the 
classification accuracy of malware categorization. As future work, 
we will extend our proposed method to malware classification and 
investigate different machine learning algorithms. 
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